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Beyond Individual Choice
by Michael Bacharach with Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden
The Oxford economist and game  theorist Michael Bacharach devoted a substantial portion of his 
life to studying how people behave in games. Sadly he died before his magum opus Beyond Individual 
Choice could be completed. Fortunately Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden picked up where Bacharach left 
off and “edited” his incomplete work to the level where it has been released as a full length book.
As might be expected in a book that was finished by different authors po sthumously, the style of 
the book is a little mixed. Bacharach is from an older less formal school of analysis than most modern 
economists – including Sugden. The introduction and conclusion which were added by the editors to tie 
the book together are stylistically quite different than the core of the book written by Bacharach. 
Although they have kept the arguments  informal, the editors write in the terse style of a modern journal 
rather than following the more relaxed literary style of Bacharach himself. Given the constraints they 
faced, this was a good choice by the editors – although it is a bit jarring to move from the introduction to 
the first chapter.
The introduction does a good job of laying out the basic theme of the book. There are three 
puzzles in game theory: why do people succeed so well in pure coordination games; what is a coherent 
theory of why the pick the efficient equilibrium in a pure coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria 
(the hi-lo game of the book); and why do they cooperate so much in the prisoners dilemma game? 
Bacharach's central thesis is that there is a common explanation for these puzzles and it lies in the way in 
which people reason. While his critique of other theories is at best hard to follow, his own insight is clear 
and useful. The editors provide a simple and instructive example in their introduction: imagine that there 
are four strategies: three labeled red and one labeled blue. Suppose as well that strategies are 
indistinguishable except for their labels. This means that the effective choices are to pick a strategy at 
random (“pick a thing”); pick a red strategy at random (“pick a red”) and “pick the blue.” If the goal is to 
coordinate, “pick the blue” leads to 100% chance of coordination. This is a useful observation, and one 
that has been developed in some detail with full evolutionary dynamics in Binmore and Samuelson's 
marvelous paper “The Evolution of Focal Points.”
If Bacharach's insight has led to a useful and workable theory about coordi nation games, his 
insight into the Prisoner's Dilemma game is less well developed. Here he argues that the relevant 
reasoning is about what group you belong to. He argues that evolutionary pressure leads to altruism 
within groups. This relies on the standard positive assortive matching argument  explaining why altruism 
emerges from evolutionary forces. The argument is not fully developed, however, and in particular the 
application to group identification that he sees as key is not developed. So we have the observation that 
positive assortive matching can lead to altruistic behavior and that this explains cooperation. This is 
coupled with the notion that altruism depends on some measure of group identification – here is where 
the reasoning argument comes in: how do you figure out who is  in your group? However, while this is 
plausible enough as a fact, there is no real theory of what it might mean in practice, nor is there an 
underlying evolutionary theory of why it should be true. The discussion is clever never-the-less and there 
are clues here that may lead to more developed models in the future.
As we move to the final chapter of the book, Bacharach takes on reasoning within teams. Here he 
chooses the unfortunate example of how players coordinate in a soccer match – focusing on the off-side 
trap in particular. The most significant conclusion I can draw from this section is that Bacharach has 
never played or coached soccer (or any other sport apparentl y). Players in my experience do not succeed 
in coordinating spontaneously. Plays are designed by a central planner (the coach, in my case with the 
help of textbooks on soccer) who then forces the players to practice the conti ngencies repeatedly until 
they can coordinate without reasoning. While the book is  an interesting read and contains much insight, I 
am afraid that in the end Bacharach overreaches by suggesting that teamwork – in reality planned and 
practiced in advance – can be understood by reference to frames of reasoning.